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bUniversité Sorbonne Paris Cité, Bureau B211, LIPN Université Paris XIII, Campus de
Villetaneuse, 99 Avenue Jean-Baptiste Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse FRANCE
a, c,dUniversity of Cagliari, Department of Business and Economics, Viale S. Ignazio 17,
09123, Cagliari, ITALY
Published: 14 October 2020
The role of Twitter as a platform to share opinions has been growing in
the recent years especially since it has been widely used by public personae
such as politicians, personalities of the show business, and other influencers
to communicate with the public. For these reasons, the use of social bots to
manipulate information and influence people’s opinions is also growing. In
this paper, we use a supervised classification model to distinguish bots from
legitimate users on Twitter. More specifically, we show the importance of
sentiment features in bot-human account detection. Moreover, we evaluate
our detection model by testing on Russian bot accounts which are a recent
set of social bots that appeared on Twitter to show that these techniques
may be easily adapted to work on new, unseen types of social bots.
keywords: Bot Account Detection, Sentiment Analysis, Random Forest,
Social Bot, Russian Bot.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, social media are very popular and have become a part of our daily life.
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top social media after Facebook, according to the Alexa ranking report1. Furthermore,
Twitter is a popular source of news and constitutes a virtual place that connects people
and allows them to share and discuss publicly their opinions. At the same time, these
features attract not only legitimate users that post millions of tweets every day, but also
automated software programs (a.k.a. bots) that can generate either harmful/malicious
content or act as automated advertisers in a more innocuous way (Chu et al., 2010; Yang
et al., 2013; Stringhini et al., 2010; Wang, 2010). Moreover, among the malicious bots,
it is possible to find different kinds of malicious activities; besides the direct propagation
of viruses to infect users’ devices, they can also influence public opinion by spreading
fake news and posting rumors. Last but not least, another malicious activity is to post
Spam content with the objective to steal information and money from legitimate users
(Ferrara et al., 2016).
Twitter has been improving its techniques to detect and remove the inappropriate bots
and their content from the platform. However, new generations of bots are increasingly
performing in a more intelligent way (Yang et al., 2013). The newest “social” bots are
able to imitate the behavior of human users and to intelligently evade the detection
techniques utilized by Twitter (Boshmaf et al., 2011; Haustein et al., 2014; Cresci et al.,
2017; Abokhodair et al., 2016). A particular and noteworthy case is represented by
accounts that have been involved in malicious activities to influence elections, such as
the 2016 presidential elections in the US2, or the ones in France in 20173. Classifying all
these accounts as bots is probably a simplification: there are also some human-controlled
accounts. However, their behavior is similar: they spread inflammatory comments and
false news to influence the outcome of elections, while trying to look like common citizens
expressing their opinions.
Therefore, it is necessary to revise the existing bot detection approaches to take into
account these malicious behaviors. Recently, many techniques have been proposed by
scholars to automatically detect social bots, based on the stylistic differences between
social bots and humans (Chavoshi et al., 2016; Chu et al., 2010; Ferrara et al., 2016;
Cresci et al., 2017). As an example, Chu et al. (2010) have shown how a human replies to
a tweet more exhaustively while the reply of bots are more simple and concise. Moreover,
the devices used by bots to post their tweets are different. According to the authors,
humans usually use web or mobile device to post their tweets while bots usually access
Twitter via APIs to make the automation easier. Finally, they proposed a classifier
system to identify bots and humans based on a set of extracted features from account
properties. In another example, Ferrara et al. (2016) introduced a public social bot
detection system called Botometer. Their supervised learning method is built around
a set of features that include networks, users, friends, contents, sentiments, and timing
based features.
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tion techniques, analyzing their behavior might give very significant knowledge to im-
prove the detection methods. However, social bots take advantage of modern language
models to appear human-like (Cresci et al., 2017) and also post in different languages
to attract more people. Therefore, models should combine both language-dependent
features that allow identifying those language regularities that are expected from an
automated system, and language-independent features to be able to detect these bots in
different languages.
In this paper, we use a supervised classification model to discriminate humans from
bots on Twitter, based on the combined use of language-independent features, like profile
based features, and language-dependent features using sentiment dictionaries. In this
way, we are able to demonstrate the importance of the various feature groups as well as
how sentiment features can be an influential alternative for other language-dependent
features to adapt the detection model and make it more accurate and robust. This
model is then applied to the malicious accounts that were used to influence the 2016 US
elections (Popken, 2017). We show that the model can be easily extended by including
a small number of observations into the training set.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the datasets
and the different types of features used in the Bot Account Detection model. Section
3 describes the classification model and shows how it has been used for Social Bots
detection. Section 4 extends the model to the Russian bots, whilst Section 5 ends the
paper with some concluding remarks.
2 Datasets and Features
We rely on two different datasets, one containing both genuine accounts and social bots,
while the second contains the accounts that have been labelled by media as “Russian
bots”. These accounts appeared during the U.S. presidential elections in 2016.
The first dataset has been introduced by Cresci et al. (2017). It consists of manually
selected genuine accounts corresponding to human operated accounts, hereafter called
Genuine (G), and social bots (SB) that advertise the hashtag #Talnts on Twitter. This
hashtag corresponds to a smartphone application, named Talnts, that enables users to
discover, connect, and collaborate with professional talent in their localities. The second
dataset has been published by Popken (2017) and includes tweet from the so-called
‘Russian bot’ (RB) accounts published during the U.S presidential elections in 2016.
We have cleaned the datasets after the extraction of the English tweets by removing
punctuation and lemmatizing the content of tweets. The removal of all non-English
tweets was dictated by the use of sentiment dictionaries that support the English lan-
guage only. Table 1 summarizes the main information about the datasets used in the
statistical analysis. After data cleaning, for the first dataset we have 237 genuine ac-
counts with 440, 999 tweets and 234 social bot accounts with 77, 256 tweets. So, in total,
there are 471 accounts and 518, 255 tweets. Thus, the probability to observe a genuine
tweet is P (G) = 0.851 whilst that of observing a social bot is P (B) = 0.149. As for the
RB (Russian bots) dataset, there are 356 RB users with 192, 473 tweets.
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Table 1: Number of users and tweets for each of the categories of users in the datasets.
Name N-Users N-Tweets
Genuine (G) 237 440,999
Social bot (SB) 234 77,256
Russian bot (RB) 356 192,473
In the following, we provide the main information about the features included either
in the genuine accounts dataset or in the Russian bot dataset. We consider a set of 465
different features. They are also listed in Table 2 where they have been grouped into
four main categories:
1. Statistical features (Profile): This set of features includes the information ex-
tracted from the profile of a user and has been widely used in previous studies
(Lee et al., 2011; Ferrara et al., 2016; Chu et al., 2010; Singh et al., 2016). Ef-
fective features in this category are: the number of characters of the username
(name len), of digits in the username (name digit), of followers (n followers), of
followings (n followings); of favorites (n favorites); the age of the account in days
(account age), the account reputation (reputation), the FOFO ratio (fofo ratio),
the Twitter activity ratio (tweet activity), statistics about favorites and replies
(average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and median).
2. Statistical features (Content): The impact of content-based features has been
shown by many studies (Yang et al., 2013; Chu et al., 2010; Ferrara et al., 2016;
Pasca et al., 2018). We derive some statistical features (average, standard devia-
tion, maximum, minimum, and entropy) from the original features extracted from
the content of tweets. For example, we consider the number hashtags and, for each
user, we compute the above-mentioned statistics of interest. Likewise, the same
computations are carried out for the number of url contained in a tweet (url),
the number of times a user mentioned someone in a tweet (mention), the num-
ber of punctuation marks (exclamation and question), the number of characters
(n char) and words (n words).
3. Word Frequency features (Content): Frequent words are also representative
of the content of tweets. We select the 400 most frequent words (excluding stop-
words), occurring more than 1, 000 times in the dataset. We then compute the
number of times each frequent word appears in the history of a given account.
4. Sentiment features (Content): Sentiment analysis is the process of discovering
people’s opinions, attitude or mood on different topics. It is growing rapidly since
social media are widely used to share opinion and feelings about a product, news or
a service (Kolchyna et al., 2015) and has been applied several times for classification
experiments on Twitter’s data (see, for example, Corallo et al. (2019) and Tavazoee
et al. (2020)). The main motivation behind using sentiment features as predictors
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in a classification model is that usually humans express more emotion to interact
with their friends in social media than bots (Chu et al., 2010). For this purpose,
we exploit three different well-known lexicons, namely AFFIN11 (Nielsen, 2011),
Hu-liu (Hu and Liu, 2004) and LabMt (Dodds et al., 2011) to derive some polarity-
based features. In particular, in this set of features we include the user specific
average number of emoticons and its standard deviation, as well as other statistics
obtained from the three considered dictionaries.We exploit sentiments using the
following Lexicon-Based Approaches.
The AFFIN11 sentiment lexicon is a list of 2, 461 labeled words with a value ranging
from −5 (the most negative) to +5 (the most positive). To extract the polarity
of each single tweet, we sum the sentiment score of each single word. For each
individual account, we compute the average and standard deviation of the scores
obtained for its tweets.
The Hu-Liu polarity lexicon provides 2, 006 positive and 4, 797 negative manu-
ally labeled words. For each single tweet, similarly to previous lexicon, we count
the number of positive and negative words and then compute their average and
standard deviation.
LabMt is a lexical source of 5, 000 words designed for sentiment analysis. The
words’ scores range from 1.30 for the word terrorist (the most negative) to 8.50 for
the word laughter (the most positive). Likewise other lexicons, for each tweet, we
sum the score of single words and compute the statistical attributes. The sentiment





where L is a sentiment lexicon, w a word in the tweet and L[w] is the score of
w according to L. For each lexicon, we compute the average µ and the standard









In the case of the Hu-Liu polarity lexicon we calculate a separate score for the
positive and the negative part of the lexicon, as if they were two separate lexicons.
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3 Detecting Social Bots
As we aim to evaluate whether a Twitter account is a bot or a human, this problem
corresponds to a binary classification task. We begin our analysis restricting the at-
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tention on the first dataset only (genuine accounts dataset) and evaluate three different
classification approaches using the features introduced in the previous section: Support
Vector Machines (SVM, e.g.: Chang and Lin (2011)), Random Forests (RF, Breiman
(2001)) and Neural Network (NN). SVM is used with maximum margin classifiers (e.g.:
Tzelepis et al. (2018)) that perform usually well on binary classification tasks. Random
Forests (RF) is considered for classifying the Twitter accounts using 465 features be-
cause of its generally acknowledged good performance. It has been evaluated on many
domains and has been proved to outperform other classifiers (Fernández-Delgado et al.,
2014; Carpita et al., 2019). The NN implementation is a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
with back-propagation (e.g. Bridle (1990)) and one hidden layer composed by 32 units.
In Table 3 we show the results obtained for the three different classifiers on the genuine
accounts dataset: human accounts are labeled with H whilst bot accounts are labeled
with B. The ground truth for the genuine dataset is P (H) = 0.503 and P (B) = 0.497,
according to the numbers reported in Table 1. We evaluate the results in terms of the F1
score (also F-score or F-measure) that is among the gold standard measures in binary
classification to evaluate accuracy. It considers both precision and recall, where the
former is the number of correctly identified positive results divided by the number of
all positive results, including those not identified correctly, and the latter is the number
of correctly identified positive results divided by the number of all samples that should
have been identified as positive. F-measure is thus the harmonic mean of precision and
recall. The highest possible value of F is one, indicating perfect precision and recall,
whilst the lowest possible value is zero, if either the precision or the recall is zero.
Table 3: Results on the genuine accounts dataset (Ten-fold cross validation) with the
three classification methods.
Method F-measure F-measure (H class) F-measure (B class)
SVM 0.660 0.655 0.665
NN 0.955 0.956 0.955
RF 0.970 0.971 0.969
Given the results obtained from the classifiers in the first step of our analysis, we chose
the RF classifier to carry out the remaining experiments, in particular those needed to
answer the following research questions:
 How important are the sentiment-based features for bot vs. human account detec-
tion systems when they are merged with other effective features?
 Is there a way to blur the effect of language-dependent features in order to facilitate
the portability of the detection system across different languages?
3.1 Feature Importance Analysis
To address the first research question, we hereby highlight the contribution of the features
based on the mean decrease in impurity (Ahmadi et al., 2016) as well as on an index
382 Tavazoee et al.
expressing how they affect the accuracy of the classification model. This is done in order
to give a better insight into the relevance of sentiment features.
To understand the most influential features in the model, we extract the features’
importance of the RF classifier. The top 30 features are represented in Figure 1. As
the figure shows, account profile based features have the highest impact on decreasing
the mean impurity of the tree classifiers followed by sentiment-based features and, in
the end, content-based statistical features. Interestingly, most of the sentiment features
proposed in this study are listed among the top important features. This result proves
the importance of sentiment-based information extracted from the content of tweets.
Figure 1: The most influential features (mean decrease impurity). Variable description
reported in Table 1 and Section 2
As an additional experiment, we extract the most effective features influencing the
accuracy of the model to investigate groups of features having the strongest impact on
model accuracy. As Table 4 shows, profile and sentiment-based features are listed as the
most effective features.
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Table 4: The most Influential features (accuracy)








3.2 Results and Discussion
To address our second research question it is possible to argue, as outlined in Section
1, that the new generation of social bots behaves intelligently and posts in different
languages in social media platforms to attract more followers. In this respect, if a
classification model is designed on less language-dependent features, it can be effectively
employed for other languages with minimal efforts.
As Table 5 shows, comparing Random Forest accuracy obtained with 10-fold cross-
validation for the two language-dependent groups of content based features, namely word
frequency features and sentiment-based ones (see Sec.2), it can be noticed that, although
the number of sentiment features (8) is much smaller than the number of frequent word
features (400), the model using the combination of sentiment-based features along with
the set of base features lead us to identify the most accurate classifier.
Table 5: Accuracy of Random Forest based on different features group
Feature Groups F-measure N.of features
Base: Statistical (Profile & Content) 0.968478 57
Base + Sentiment 0.970652 57+8
Base + Word Frequency 0.961598 57+400
Base + Sentiment + Word Frequency 0.957387 57+8+400
It is clear that sentiment features can outperform word frequency features with a
relatively high margin (almost 1%) if one considers that there are more than 300 million
active Twitter accounts and 1% means predicting correctly the purpose of more than 3
million accounts. These results demonstrate that word frequency features can be reliably
replaced by dictionary-based sentiment features, as the latter not only allow to build a
more parsimonious (i.e., with less features) classifier, but also allows us to improve model
accuracy and are more robust across languages.
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Moreover, results reported in Table 5 are remarkable because the decrease in compu-
tational complexity caused by limiting the number of possible features for each split of
the trees grown during the creation of a random forest is considerably large. In fact,
it is well known that building a random forest with B trees induces a complexity of
O (B ×
√
m× n log n), with m being the number of variables (
√
m that used for node
spitting), n the number of instances and logn the tree depth. In our case, moving to
57+8 features from 57(+8)+400 consistently decreases the
√
m factor influencing com-
putational complexity (Louppe, 2014).
4 Extending the model to detect the ‘Russian bots’
In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of our classification model focusing on the
detection of Russian bots (RB). Specifically, we aim to answer three additional research
questions:
 How well the model behaves when classifying unseen RB?
 How many RBs are needed to improve the RB detection rate of the model? What
is the role of sentiment features in the detection of RBs?
 How the Russian bots behave differently from humans?
To answer the three aforementioned research questions, we performed three experi-
ments.
For the first research question, we built a Random forest model on the genuine accounts
dataset, that includes genuine (G) and social bots (SB) accounts and test the model on
the Russian bot (RB) accounts dataset. Following results presented in Table 5 (Sec.
3.2) we discard the word frequency features and concentrate on the base features and
the sentiment features only. As the first row of Table 6 shows, only 29% of RB can be
detected if the training set does not contain any sample of the new bots (that is, the
model built on SBs is not effective enough to detect RBs).
To address the second and third research questions, we gradually include a few number
of randomly selected RB users to our training set. This inclusion simulates the manual
recognition of a finite set of RB bots. Next, we build a Random Forest model with and
without sentiment features to assess if including a few positive samples to the training set
can influence the detection rate as well as to verify whether the set of chosen sentiment
features is able to improve model fitting. To this end, we consider four different designs
by randomly appending some RB users. The number of appended RB users varies from
5 to 20 with an increment of 5. The aim is to find out how many additional RBs are
needed to improve the model accuracy. In order to extract the misclassification of our
prediction model, we computed False Positive (FP) (i.e., the number of humans that
are incorrectly predicted as bots) and True Negative (TN) (i.e., the number of bots that
correctly predicted), as well as F-score which considers both recall and precision from
the confusion matrix of RF classifier for each experiment. Results of these additional
experiments are reported in columns 2-5 of Table 6. In the FP column of Table 6, in the
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Table 6: Accuracy with and without using sentiment features for each experiment. The
first row addresses the first research question. The model is built on combination
of Genuine and Social bots (SB) dataset and then tested the Russian bot (RB)
accounts dataset. A few RB users are randomly appended to the training set
and then tested on a combination of Genuine and RBs dataset. False positive
rate (FP) and True Negative Rate (TN) are computed on the dataset including
the base and sentiment features (B+S) or the base features (B) only
Training set Test set F−score FP(%) TN(%)
G SB RB G RB B+S B only B+S B only B+S B only
237 234 0 0 333 0.35 0.33 0.0 0.0 29.0 25.0
170 150 5 80 75 0.77 0.73 1.0 1.0 52.0 49.0
170 145 10 80 70 0.85 0.80 1.0 1.0 72.0 68.0
170 140 15 80 65 0.94 0.90 1.0 1.0 89.0 84.0
170 135 20 80 60 0.96 0.94 1.0 1.0 91.0 86.0
first experiment, there is no FP, because there is just one class (i.e., RB) in the test set.
For other experiments, the value of FP is fixed (i.e., 1) and the FP rate is 1% because we
only add randomly selected RBs to the training set which means the number of genuine
account observations is intact. In other words, there is no change in modeling genuine
accounts and there is only one account that is misclassified for all experiments. As Table
6 shows, the set of sentiment features can relatively affect the True Negative rate. In
addition, even with a very few positive samples, we can dramatically improve the bot
detection rate. Moreover, the more samples we add to the training set, the better is the
bot detection rate we achieve.
In the third experiment, we remove all the SB users from the dataset and merge the G
users with RB ones. Next, we run random forest on this modified dataset and estimate
the 10 fold cross validation error. The performance of the model is pretty good since it
is able to detect the RB users with 98% accuracy. Furthermore, to prove the usefulness
of the RF classifier in our experiments, we compare the performance of RF classifier
in the third experiment with Naive Bayes as well as Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifiers. The RF classifier outperforms other classifiers w.r.t. accuracy: results show
that accuracy of RF is 98% whilst that of SVM (Naive Bayes) is 93%(85%).
Next, we observe the performance of features individually in order to understand how
they affect the RB accounts. As Figure 2 shows, Russian bots follow some simple rules as
they need to advertise themselves and spread their malicious contents reaching a greatest
audience. Figure 2 shows that these bots use a higher number of hashtags and urls on
their tweets compared to humans whilst tweeting less in comparison to humans in their
lifetime. It is also interesting to note that these bots tend to produce content that is
slightly more negative than humans (bottom panel of Figure 2). This seems to support
the findings of Klenner (2018) that extreme right discourse is particularly polarizing and
contains concepts related to fear to cause an emotive reaction in people.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the distribution of the values for some features for the “Russian
bots” in Popken (2017) and human users. Blue are human users, red are
Russian bot accounts.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have considered a Random Forest model for social bot detection on Twitter using four
different categories of features. Our approach achieves very high accuracy by relying on a
set of dictionary-based sentiment features that have not been used in previous researches
on this topic besides a set of previously known features.
First, we have shown the effectiveness of sentiment features, that can be used in place
of other language-dependent features, such as bag-of-words or word embeddings, with
the result of simplifying the classification model without reducing its effectiveness. In
this respect, sentiment features proved to be high-level representatives of the content of
the tweets, at least for the bot detection purpose.
Second, we have examined the detection rate on the RB dataset and discovered, in-
terestingly, that if we add only few RB observations to the training set our, model is
able to accurately predict the rest of the RB. In this respect, if Twitter identifies a few
number of new set of bots manually and add it to the training set, the model is able to
detect the rest of that campaign of bots.
In addition, as Table 6 shows, we approved the impact of our novel sentiment features
on predicting the RB users.
Finally, we have analyzed the RB accounts behavior to extract the characteristic of
RBs. We concluded that the new generation of bots still follow some simple rules to
catch their victims in Twitter.
These results can be exploited to ease the task of mapping the model to other lan-
guages by building a model around sentiment lexicons. We aim to perform additional
experiments on other languages in the future.
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